Britisk regeringsrapport blev skrevet af efter studerende

Student som hemmelig kilde

Den nitten sider lange regeringsrapport, som blev offentliggjort af statsminister Tony Blaris eget kontor som støtte til Colin Powells anklager mod Saddam Hussein, indeholder flere passager, der ord for ord er identiske med en artikel skrevet af den amerikanske studerende Ibrahim al-Marashi i septembernummeret af Middle East Review of International Affairs.

Artiklen hedder: »Iraq’s Security & Intelligence Network: A Guide & Analysis« – Iraks sikkerheds og efterretningsnetværk – en guide og analyse.

Et af de kopierede afsnit er seks paragraffer langt.

Kreativ afskrift

I nogle afsnit er udvalgte formuleringer blevet erstattet med skarpere Hussein-kritiske vendinger. I en passage er en sætning om, at den irakiske efterretningstjeneste Mukhabarat »overvåger udenlandske ambassader i Irak« blevet til »udspionerer udenlandske ambassader i Irak«.

Vendingen »støtter oppositionsgrupper i fjendtlige regimer« blev til det farligere »støtter terroristorganisationer i fjendtlige regimer«.

Rapporten er øjensynligt blevet lavet under så stort hastværk, at selv skrivefejl fra originalen er blevet kopieret over.

Ægte vare duede ikke

I går offentliggjorde BBC en tre uger gammel rapport fra den britiske efterretningstjeneste, der konkluderede, at Saddam Hussein ikke har forbindelser til Al Qaaeda.

Denne rapport, der ikke støttede anklagerne mod Irak, endte i en skuffe.

Tekstsammenligning

Channel 4 angiver et eksempel på, hvor ens de to dokumenter er:

Government dossier

(Page 13), published Jan 2003:

»Saddam appointed, Sabir ’Abd al-’Aziz al-Duri as head during the 1991 Gulf War. After the Gulf War he was replaced by Wafiq Jasim al-Samarrai.

After Samarrai, Muhammad Nimah al-Tikriti headed Al-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya in early 1992 then in late 1992 Fanar Zibin Hassan al-Tikriti was appointed to this post.

These shifting appointments are part of Saddam’s policy of balancing security positions. By constantly shifting the directors of these agencies, no one can establish a base in a security organisation for a substantial period of time. No one becomes powerful enough to challenge the President.«

al-Marashi document

(Section: "MILITARY INTELLIGENCE", published sept 2002.

»Saddam appointed, Sabir ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Duri(80) as head of Military Intelligence during the 1991 Gulf War.(81) After the Gulf War he was replaced by Wafiq Jasim al-Samarrai.(82)

After Samarrai, Muhammad Nimah al-Tikriti(83) headed Military Intelligence in early 1992(84) then in late 1992 Fanar Zibin Hassan al-Tikriti was appointed to this post.(85) While Fanar is from Tikrit, both Sabir al-Duri and Samarrai are non-Tikriti Sunni Muslims, as their last names suggest.

Another source indicates that Samarrai was replaced by Khalid Salih al-Juburi,(86) demonstrating how another non-Tikriti, but from the tribal alliance that traditionally support the regime holds top security positions in Iraq.(87)

These shifting appointments are part of Saddam’s policy of balancing security positions between Tikritis and non-Tikritis, in the belief that the two factions would not unite to overthrow him. Not only that, but by constantly shifting the directors of these agencies, no one can establish a base in a security organization for a substantial period of time, that would challenge the President.(88)«

Af Sven Gårn Hansen/Monsun

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